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ABSTRACT
In South Korea, due to concurrent financial scandals, Korean legislators implemented 
two major audit policies in the 2000s; the mandatory audit “partner” rotation policy 
in 2000 and the mandatory audit “firm” rotation policy in 2006. The mandatory audit 
“firm” rotation policy was introduced as a mean to improve audit quality based on 
the auditor entrenchment hypothesis. In this paper, we compare the audit quality of 
firms subjected to mandatory audit “firm” rotation with two benchmark groups, a 
sample that adopted the policy voluntarily; the second group consists of the mandatory 
“firm” rotation sample in years prior, a period firms were subject to mandatory audit 
“partner” rotation. Using accrual-based measures as proxies for audit quality, we find 
evidence that audit quality of the mandatory rotation firm sample is lower compared to 
firms that voluntarily adopted the policy. Furthermore, we find evidence that audit quality 
of the mandatory rotation firm sample is lower compared to the mandatory audit partner 
firm sample. Additionally, we also find evidence that the mandatory audit firms rotation 
sample whose auditors were rotated from Non-Big4 to Big4 are generally associated with 
lower levels of abnormal accruals consistent with the argument that the audit quality of 
Big4 accounting firms is superior to Non-Big4 firms. Finally, longer audit tenure and 
switches to Big4 audit firms generally have a positive effect upon audit quality. These 
findings suggest that extended audit tenure improves audit quality due to accounting firm’s 
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accumulated client specific knowledge. Thus, our evidence suggests that the mandatory 
audit firm rotation policy did not have the desired effect in a Korean context. 
Keywords: mandatory audit firm rotation, mandatory audit partner rotation, abnormal 
accruals, audit quality
INTRODUCTION
Public concern over instances of accounting fraud has increased due to major 
accounting scandals. A review of auditor behaviour from recent U.S. accounting 
scandals suggests auditors did not possess sufficient skepticism, objectivity or 
independence; hence, audit quality deteriorates with longer audit tenure (DeFond 
& Francis, 2005). Mandatory audit firm rotation has been considered as a policy 
with the potential to improve audit quality for decades. However, in the early 2000s, 
the Enron and the WorldCom financial scandals reignited the debate. Opponents of 
the mandatory audit firm rotation policy argue that auditing errors are more likely 
to occur in the initial years of the auditor-client relationship due to the loss of 
auditors’ cumulative knowledge. On the other hand, proponents of the mandatory 
audit firm rotation policy argue that prolonged audit tenure negatively affects the 
auditor-client relationship because managers often have an opportunity to manage 
earnings when audit firms have an incentive to satisfy client’s requests to retain an 
audit contract, which creates a basic conflict.
The Korean setting provides a unique opportunity to conduct empirical 
analysis on the effectiveness of the mandatory audit “firm” rotation policy 
on audit quality, a relatively rare policy internationally. Korea adopted the 
mandatory audit “firm” rotation policy because of concurrent financial scandals 
since 1997. In 2001, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) mandated a 
three-year mandatory audit “partner” rotation policy in response to the Kia and 
Korean Air accounting scandals. In 2002, in the U.S., the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) considered the mandatory audit “firm” rotation policy while 
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), following major U.S. financial scandals 
to restore public confidence in the profession. However, based on the research 
conducted by the General Accounting Office, the SEC decided not to adopt the 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy. In 2003, the Financial Supervisory Service 
(the Korean regulator, hereafter FSS) proposed the controversial mandatory audit 
“firm” rotation policy because of the failure of SK global and Daewoo, two of 
Korea’s largest conglomerates within the mandatory audit firm “partner” rotation 
period. Mandatory audit “firm” rotation was considered to be a more robust 
policy for reducing financial mismanagement and financial scandal compared 
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to mandatory audit “partner” rotation by the Korean government, based on the 
auditor entrenchment hypothesis. The mandatory audit “firm” rotation policy was 
not adopted in the U.S. on the grounds the social cost would exceed the perceived 
benefits. The mandatory audit “firm” policy became fully effective in 2006 and 
was adopted on a firm by firm basis. The mandatory audit “firm” rotation policy 
mandated that firms replace their audit firm as a service provider, every six years. 
However, the mandatory audit “firm” rotation policy ended in 2010, lasting for 
only five years due to the adoption of IFRS and political pressure due to double 
regulation.
This analysis, to our knowledge, is one of the first empirical studies 
comparing the effect of mandatory audit “firm” rotation and “partner” rotation on 
audit quality. Previous mandatory auditor rotation studies suggest that there are 
significant costs that outweigh the benefits of a “fresh look” by a new audit firm 
(Johnson, Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002; Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003; Blouin, 
Grein, & Rountree, 2007). Chi, Huang, Liao and Xie (2009) examine the effect 
of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality in Taiwan, employing absolute 
abnormal accruals as proxies for audit quality, and the earnings response coefficient 
as a proxy for perceived audit quality. They find no evidence that mandatory audit 
partner rotation enhances audit quality. Our study differs from Chi et al. (2009) by 
directly comparing the audit quality of firms that promulgate the mandatory audit 
“firm” policy after a period of mandatory audit “partner” rotation. Thus, Korea’s 
unique regulatory system enables us to make inferences about which sample has 
the highest levels of audit quality, mandatory audit “partner” or “firm” rotation.
Kwon, Lim and Simnett (2014) analyse the effect of mandatory audit firm 
rotation on audit quality and audit fees before and after 2006, the period the audit 
firm rotation policy was adopted. They find that audit fees increase after 2006, but 
audit quality remains unaffected. Our study differs from Kwon, due to the fact we 
incorporate partitioning that allows us to capture audit quality based on managers 
varying levels of opportunity to manage earnings and audit firms’ incentives to 
accommodate the managers in three-year policy periods, rather than before and 
after 2006. Our group of interests are firms subject to the mandatory audit firm 
rotation policy from 2006–2009. We compare this group with two benchmark 
groups. First, we compare the mandatory rotation sample with firms in the same 
sample period (2006–2009) which are not subject to the mandatory audit firm 
rotation policy; second, we compare the mandatory rotation sample with the firm 
itself in prior periods where the firms are subject to the mandatory partner rotation 
policy (2000–2008). We believe this partitioning adds robustness due to the fact 
that all firms did not adopt the mandatory audit firm rotation policy in 2006. In 
2006, a manager’s opportunity to manage earnings and an audit firm’s incentives 
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to accommodate managers vary dependent on the period of audit policy adoption 
(see Figure 1).
We conduct empirical tests to analyse the effect of the implementation 
of the mandatory audit firm rotation policy on audit quality. First, we use two 
measures of abnormal accruals as proxies for audit quality; the modified Jones 
model suggested by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and the performance-
adjusted Jones model suggested by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005). Abnormal 
accruals are widely used in accounting literature as proxies for earnings and/or 
audit quality (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Kothari, 2001; Myers et al., 2003; Chen, 
Lin, & Lin, 2008; Chi et al., 2009). We find evidence that the audit quality of 
the mandatory audit firm rotation sample is lower or indifferent, compared to the 
samples in the same sample period (2006–2009). Moreover, we find evidence that 
the audit quality of a firm in the mandatory audit firm rotation sample is lower or 
indifferent compared to earlier years under the mandatory partner rotation policy 
(2000–2008). Thus, we find evidence supporting the auditor expertise hypothesis 
that mandatory audit firm rotation does not enhance audit quality. The results are 
robust to various forms of additional analysis.
Secondly, we examine the relationship between audit quality and four 
different types of audit ‘switch’ for the mandatory audit firm rotation sample. 
Numerous studies find that Big4 auditors provide higher audit quality information 
compared to non-Big4 auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, 
& Subramanyam, 1998; Khurana & Raman, 2004; Behn, Choi, & Kang, 2008). 
Consistent with the current literature, we find that levels of abnormal accruals 
decrease as firms are mandatorily rotated from non-Big4 to Big4 audit firms. 
Concurrently, we test the association between audit tenure and audit quality. 
Numerous studies find audit quality increases with audit tenure (Myers et al., 2003; 
Chi & Huang, 2005; Chi et al., 2009). Our results suggest that longer audit tenure 
has a positive effect on audit quality, consistent with previous findings.
This study is motivated by the varying policy decisions of the world’s 
largest two economic regions, the U.S. and the European Union. In April 2014, the 
European Parliament approved a mandatory audit firm rotation policy, requiring 
European listed companies, banks and financial institutions to appoint a new audit 
firm every 10 years. However, in the U.S., the mandatory audit firm rotation policy, 
a policy suggested by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
was rejected by the U.S. House of Representatives. Therefore, our findings may be 
of interest to both groups of legislators. Our study makes several contributions. First, 
previous studies empirically examine the effect of a mandatory audit firm rotation 
policy and a mandatory audit partner rotation policy on audit quality in individual 
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tests. However, we compare the audit quality of a mandatory audit “firm” rotation 
period with a mandatory audit “partner” rotation. Secondly, the majority of studies 
compare audit quality before and after legislation is introduced using a “before and 
after” calendar year approach. However, due to Korea’s unique experiment with 
audit policy, we partition our sample to capture managers’ opportunity to manage 
earnings and auditors’ incentives to satisfy clients to retain an audit contract. 
This partitioning is necessary because audit firms and managers have different 
incentives based on the period of policy adoption. Thus, our partitioning captures 
an auditors’ incentive to impair independence based on policy adoption period 
rather than calendar year. Thirdly, we consider the partial effect of audit switch 
type and audit tenure. Forth, our study extends previous Korean studies in several 
distinctive manners, including the use of two unique benchmark samples. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Setting 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that the Korean 
economy can be considered comparable to developed countries; however, in 
the past, Korea’s legal enforcement has been considered weak. Recent evidence 
suggests that South Korea’s legislative infrastructure is improving. A report by 
the FTSE, the London Stock Exchange suggests that in most respects South 
Korea satisfies the definitions and standards of a developed market (Woods, 
2013). Korea’s economy has developed rapidly; however, financial scandals have 
necessitated Korea’s experimentation with numerous audit policies. Numerous 
countries practice the mandatory audit partner rotation policy. The mandatory 
audit firm rotation policy is a legal requirement for only a small number of 
countries. For instance, firms in Italy and Brazil are required to rotate their audit 
firms every nine and five years respectively. The Korean setting is unique because 
the mandatory audit firm rotation policy, a policy which is rare internationally 
coexisted with the mandatory partner rotation policy because firms adopted both 
policies on an individual basis. The mandatory audit “partner” and “firm” rotation 
policies are significantly different with regards to the auditor-client relationship. 
The mandatory audit “partner” rotation policy allows a firm to retain the services 
of an audit firm under the supervision of another partner or affiliate. The mandatory 
audit “firm” rotation policy requires firms to change their audit company after a 
specified period. The mandatory audit “firm” and “partner” rotation policies differ 
in the sense that the relationship between clients and auditors are different after a 
“partner” and “firm” rotation. Mandatory audit “partner” rotation enables partners 
within the same audit firm to cooperate, hence audit firms are able maintain firm 
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specific knowledge. The mandatory “firm” rotation is designed to promote auditor 
independence; however, increased auditor independence will almost certainly lead 
to a decrease in firm specific knowledge. Korea is the very first country to adopt 
the mandatory audit firm rotation policy after the high-profile accounting scandals 
and the passage of SOX. Thus, it is possible to empirically test the difference 
in audit quality between the mandatory audit firm rotation sample (2006–2009) 
and the audit quality of two benchmark groups (2000–2009), the mandatory audit 
“partner” group, and firms that adopt the policy on a voluntary basis. If accounting 
quality increases after mandatory audit “firm” rotation, the results would suggest 
that increased auditor independence has the desired effect, consistent with the 
auditor entrenchment hypothesis. If abnormal accrual increase or do not change 
after the adoption of the mandatory audit “firm” policy, the policy can be seen as 
having a negative effect on audit quality through the loss of firm specific knowledge 
attainable under the mandatory audit “partner” rotation policy, consistent with the 
auditor expertise hypothesis.
In 2003, the SSB (Securities Supervisory Board, the predecessor of FSC) 
of Korea promulgated a policy that required corporate entities to rotate their audit 
firm every six years on a mandatory basis (effective in 2006). This policy was 
introduced because of public distrust in the Korean external audit system due 
to auditing errors. Prior to 1982, Korea adopted an auditor designation “rule”, 
whereby the regulatory body, SSB, assigned external auditors for all listed firms. In 
1982, the Korean government introduced the free audit engagement “rule” because 
of increasingly interdependent capital markets and the international convergence 
of accounting standards. Thus, the decision of the Korean government to adopt 
the audit engagement rule in lieu of the mandatory designation system was 
designed to integrate the Korea’s accounting system in-line with international 
accounting trends. Moreover, moral and ethical issues involving CPAs in the 1970s 
accelerated the repeal of the designation rule in 1981. The free audit engagement 
“rule” permitted a firm the right to independently choose an audit firm for the 
first time. Since firms were able to select their audit firm in 1982, the power of 
audit engagement negotiation moved from audit firms to client companies which 
impeded the protection of auditor independence. In 1997, the FSC promulgated 
two additional rules that require firms to retain auditors for three-years, and audit 
partner rotation after five years. In 2001, the FSC mandated a three-year mandatory 
partner rotation policy in response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the Kia 
and Korean Air accounting scandals. In 2003, investigators found that abnormally 
high levels of window dressing caused the collapse of Daewoo, one of the largest 
conglomerates in 1999. The incident damaged the reputation of Angin Deloitte, 
one of the largest audit firms in Korea, the Korean government and the accounting 
profession.
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 In 2003, a period the mandatory auditor partner rotation was being practiced, 
SK Global, another large Korean conglomerate overstated earnings by 1.5 trillion 
won. In 2003, the FSC announced that, on average, one of three domestic firms was 
committing accounting fraud, and seven of out ten Korean conglomerates, known 
as Chaebol, engaged in some kind of earnings manipulation. Thus, following a 
period of successive financial failures, Korean regulators were required to consider 
policies to improve audit quality and to increase public confidence in public 
auditing. In 2003, the FSC promulgated the mandatory audit firm rotation policy. 
The introduction of the mandatory audit firm rotation policy was influenced by the 
passage of SOX of 2002 in the U.S. and the establishment of PCAOB. In 2003, in 
the U.S., the PCAOB considered the adoption of the mandatory audit firm rotation 
policy, introduced by SOX. But the policy was not adopted in the U.S. on the 
grounds the social cost would exceed the perceived benefits. However, in Korea, 
consecutive accounting scandals compel legislators to adopt the mandatory audit 
firm rotation policy under the assumption of the auditor entrenchment hypothesis. 
The policy became effective in 2006 and lasted for five years until 2010. The 
FSC abolished mandatory audit firm rotation in 2010, with the adoption of IFRS 
(2009/3) and political pressure from the business community due to the additional 
cost of double regulation. 
Our study is motivated by the varying policy decisions of the two world’s 
largest economic regions, the U.S. and the EU. In 2011, in the U.S., the PCAOB 
proposed the introduction of the mandatory audit firm rotation policy despite 
opposition from audit firms and corporations. The PCAOB argue that the practice 
of the 5-year mandatory audit partner rotation policy was not sufficient to protect 
auditor independence. The PCAOB suggest that the mandatory audit firm rotation 
policy would increase audit quality through protected auditor independence, 
enhance objectivity and professional skepticism (PCAOB, 2011a). Later in 2011, 
the PCAOB issue a concept release explaining that mandatory audit firm rotation 
policy has the potential to increase investor confidence, audit quality and the 
quality of financial reporting (PCAOB, 2011b). However, in July 2013, the U.S. 
House of Representatives introduce legislation that would prevent the PCAOB 
from implementing the audit firm rotation policy.
Following the PCAOB’s announcement in the U.S., the European 
Commission (EC) announced its intention to adopt the mandatory audit firm 
rotation policy (Dalton, 2011; Brunsden, 2011). Following the announcement, the 
European Union’s agreement in December 2013 (EU 2013) contained requirements 
for the mandatory rotation of auditors after 10 years for public interest entities 
(PIEs). In April 2014, the European Parliament approved the mandatory audit 
firm rotation policy, requiring European listed companies, banks and financial 
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institutions to appoint a new audit firm every 10 years. Thus, the two world’s largest 
economic regions have considered implementing a mandatory audit firm rotation 
policy; however, both regions have made different policy decisions. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of the mandatory “audit partner” rotation policy and mandatory 
“audit firm” rotation policy as means to improve audit quality is an important 
empirical question left unanswered. Our findings may be of interest to regulators 
in the EU and the U.S. because Korea’s experiments with audit policy changes 
offer unique evidence of how the mandatory audit firm rotation policy effects audit 
quality.
Literature Review
Whether or not extended audit firm period vitiates auditor independence or 
enhances audit quality is a recurring debate. Proponents of audit firm rotation, 
advocates of the audit entrenchment hypothesise argue that mandatory rotation 
prevents auditors from becoming closely aligned with managers, thus maintaining 
independence. Deis and Giroux (1992) review audit quality letters produced by a 
public audit agency and conclude that audit quality declines as tenure increases. 
Brody and Moscove (1998) suggest that mandatory audit firm rotation reduces 
the influence of firm’s management on auditors and therefore can enhance audit 
quality. Ryan et al. (2001) report that extended audit tenure provides incentives 
for audit firms to retain their client’s contract, thus audit quality can be negatively 
affected. Moreover, Casterella, Knechel and Walket (2002) argue that window 
dressing and audit failures occur more frequently as audit tenure is extended.
On the other hand, opponents of mandatory audit firm rotation, advocates 
of the audit expertise hypothesise state that a number of studies report that audit 
failures occur more often in the initial stage of an audit service (Peirre & Anderson, 
1984; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA], 1992; Arrunada 
& Paz-Ares, 1997; Johnstone & Bedard, 2004; Carcello & Nagy, 2004, Chen et 
al., 2008). Johnson et al. (2002) examine the relation between audit firm tenure 
and absolute abnormal accruals. They find absolute abnormal accruals are larger in 
short tenure (two to three years), than that of medium (four to eight years) and long 
tenures (nine or more years), suggesting deterioration in audit quality in the early 
years of tenure. Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) argue that auditors issue qualified 
audit opinions on business collapses more often when audit tenure is short. Myers 
et al. (2003) report that the magnitude of both absolute abnormal accruals and 
current accruals declines with longer audit tenure, suggesting that audit quality is 
positively associated with audit tenure. 
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Recent studies suggest that mandatory partner rotation does not have a 
positive effect on audit quality. Chi and Huang (2005) examine the effect of audit 
firm and partner tenure on earnings quality independently in the Taiwanese audit 
market using signed abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings quality. They find 
lower earnings quality in the early years of audit firm and/or partner tenures as 
well as the later years of audit firm tenure. Carey and Simnett (2006) find a decline 
in audit quality, as proxied by the propensity to issue going concern opinions 
and the incidence of just beating earnings benchmarks. Chi et al. (2009) directly 
examine the effect of mandatory audit partner rotation in Taiwan and found no 
evidence that the policy enhances audit quality. However, mandatory audit firm 
rotation entails significantly higher costs to both client firms and auditors alike 
compared to mandatory audit partner rotation. Lennox, Wu and Zhang (2014) find 
evidence consistent with mandatory audit partner rotation improving audit quality 
in Chinese firms. They conjecture that a partner is motivated to clean up financial 
statements before handing them over to a new partner; moreover, a new partner 
brings in a fresh perspective. 
Thus, the literature is mixed. In the early 1990s, the literature suggests that 
increased audit tenure has a negative effect on audit quality. However, the literature 
has not reached a consensus about the benefits of mandatory audit rotation. Kwon 
et al. (2014) is the first author to study the economic impact of the mandatory 
rotation policy initiative on audit quality, and the associated implications for audit 
fees in Korea. Their study takes a pre- and post calendar year approach to compare 
pre 2006 and post 2006 periods; long vs short term audit tenure and voluntary vs 
mandated firm rotation samples. Kwon et al. (2014) suggests that audit quality 
measured as abnormal discretionary accruals do not significantly change compared 
with pre-2006 long-tenure audit period and voluntary post rotation period. Audit 
fees in the post-regulation period for mandatorily rotated engagements are 
significantly larger than in the pre-regulation period, but are discounted compared 
to audit fees for post-regulation continuing engagements.
Hypothesis Development
We build on Kwon et al.’s (2014) argument through partitioning samples to 
capture managers’ opportunity to manage earning and audit firms’ incentives to 
accommodate managers to retain audit contracts. Kwon et al. (2014) find that audit 
quality is indifferent before and after 2006, the period the mandatory audit firm 
rotation policy was adopted. However, we hypothesise that managers’ opportunity 
to manage earnings and auditors’ incentives are different in specific policy periods. 
Figure 1 illustrates, in the first three-year period of the mandatory audit partner 
rotation policy, managers have an opportunity to manage earnings because audit 
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firms have an incentive to retain their clients. In the second three-year period of 
mandatory audit partner rotation, audit firm firms will know in advance that their 
tenure will end on a given date. Therefore, managers have limited opportunity to 
manage earnings and audit firms have no incentive to retain audit contracts. After 
the second three-year mandatory audit partner rotation period expires, firms are 
either required to adopt the audit firm rotation policy voluntarily or on a mandatory 
basis. In this period, managers have limited opportunity to manage earnings and 
audit firms have no incentive to retain audit contracts. Thus, this unique context 
allows us to evaluate the effect of the mandatory audit firm rotation policy on 
audit quality. As discussed above, we believe it is highly unlikely the audit quality 
will remain unaffected in all periods because of managers’ opportunity to manage 
earnings and audit firms’ incentives in different periods. If the auditor expertise 
hypothesis is true, audit quality will be lower after the implementation of the 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy sample compared to other benchmark samples. 
If the auditor entrenchment hypothesis is true, audit quality will increase after the 
implementation of the mandatory audit firm rotation policy sample compared to 
other benchmark samples. Therefore, we develop the following hypothesis based 
on the discussions above.
H1: The audit quality of the mandatory audit firm rotation sample 
will be different compared to the benchmark samples
Several studies have examined the relationship between audit firm 
“switch” type and audit quality. DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) find firms 
that a switch from Big6 to non-Big6 audit firms increase their level of abnormal 
accruals. Following DeAngelo (1981), numerous empirical studies find evidence 
suggesting that Big4 auditors provide higher quality audit information compared 
to Non-Big4 auditors (Becker et al., 1998; Khurana & Raman, 2004; Behn et al., 
2008). Furthermore, organisations audited by large audit firms (Top 10 in China) 
are less likely to commit financial statement fraud (Lisic, Silveri, & Song, 2015). 
The literature provides three reasons why Big4 accounting firms have higher 
audit quality compared to Non-Big4. First, the income dependence of Non-Big4 
auditors is higher than Big4, creating incentives for auditors to compromise their 
independence. Second, Big4 audit firms have higher incentives to retain their 
public image and reputation to avoid litigation risk (DeAngelo, 1981; Basu, Lee, 
& Jan, 2001). Third, Big4 auditors have better audit systems and professionals. In 
consideration of the “Big4’s expertise”, we classify 4 switch types (Big4 to Big4, 
Big4 to Non-Big4, Non-Big4 to Big4, Non-Big4 to Non-Big4) to test whether the 
Non-Big4 to Big4 switch type has a positive effect on audit quality. Based on the 
pervious literature, the audit quality of the sample that switch from Non-Big4 to 
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Big4 should increase. Hence, we develop the following hypothesis based on the 
discussions above.
H2: The audit quality of the mandatory rotated audit firm sample 
will increase as firms are rotated from non-Big4 to Big4 audit 
firms.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample Selection
The sample consists of public firms listed on the KRX (Korea Stock-Exchange) 
market. All financial data, non-financial data, share price and audit tenure 
information are collected from the KIS-VALUE and the Data-Guide database 
systems. Figure 1 illustrates the major external audit policy changes to affect 
Korea from the 1980s. The auditor designation regime is replaced by the free 
audit engagement in 1982. After the Asian Financial Crisis, the FSC promulgate 
a 5-year audit partner rotation policy in 1997. In the same year, the mandatory 
auditor retention policy becomes obligatory, requiring firms to retain their external 
audit firms for at least three consecutive years. In 2001, the FSC implement the 
mandatory audit partner rotation policy, whereby audit partners are required to be 
rotated at least once every three years. The Korean regulatory authority introduces 
the policy of mandatory audit firm rotation in December 2003. The policy comes 
into effect from 2006 and ends in 2010 due to the introduction of IFRS and political 
pressure from accounting firms and corporate entities. 
Firms adopted the mandatory audit firm rotation policies on a firm-by-
firm basis. Therefore, to disentangle the effect of the mandatory partner rotation 
policy on audit quality from two benchmark samples, data is hand collected and 
firms are partitioned accordingly. Figure 1 illustrates the partitioning. The vertical 
partitioning illustrates if the firm sample is subject to the mandatory audit firm 
rotation sample (MROT). No mandatory rotation (NROT) sample firms are not 
subject to mandatory audit firm rotation. The horizontal partitioning captures 
managers varying levels of opportunity to manage earnings and audit firms’ 
incentives to accommodate managers. We split the sample into three groups 
and two sub-groups over the sample, period 2000 to 2009. The first sample, the 
mandatory partner rotation sample (PROT henceforth) consists of firms subjected 
to the three-year mandatory partner rotation policy from 2000–2008. The PROT 
sample has been partitioned into two sub-samples, because auditors are likely 
to have different incentives in different periods. In PROT 1, the first three-year 
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period of the mandatory partner rotation policy, auditors have an incentive to 
accommodate clients because an audit firm could potentially retain the business 
of the client under a different partner. In PROT 2, the second three-year period of 
the mandatory partner rotation policy, auditors have no incentive to accommodate 
clients because of the imminent introduction of the mandatory audit firm rotation 
which does not allow client retention. The PROT 1 and PROT 2 sample firms 
adopted the mandatory audit firm rotation policy (MROT). 
Figure 1. Major external audit policy changes, FROT sample and two benchmark 
samples
The second group of interests are organisations that voluntarily rotated their 
audit firms (VROT henceforth) from 2006–2009. VROT firms did not adopt the 
mandatory audit firm rotation (NROT). Our final group, our group of interests 
are firms that were required to adopt the mandatory audit firm rotation policy on 
obligatory basis (FROT henceforth) from 2006–2009. FROT firms are required to 
practice mandatory audit firm rotation (MROT). As depicted in Figure 1, period 
(PROT) 1 and 2 have a fixed-term of three years since listed firms are subject to 
the three-year mandatory auditor retention policy. Period 3 varies from 1 year to 4 
years depending on the rotation year. For instance, for firms whose external auditors 
were mandatorily rotated in 2006, period 3 consists of 4 years (2006, 2007, 2008 
and 2009); firms whose auditors were rotated in 2009, period 3 constitutes only one 
year (2009). The coexistence of both regimes during the period under consideration 
necessitates a careful decomposition of observations into target and benchmark 
samples. Given 0 is the period an audit firm is mandatorily rotated, PROT 1 
indicates a three-year period from year –6 to year  –4 and PROT 2 represents a 
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three-year period from year –3 to year –1. Thus, we compare the FROT sample, the 
mandatory audit firm rotation sample with the benchmark groups specified above; 
the VROT sample consisting of firms that adopted the mandatory firm rotation 
policy voluntarily and PROT, two subsamples (PROT 1 and PROT 2) consisting of 
the FROT sample prior to the adoption of the mandatory audit firm rotation policy.
Table 1 specifies the sample selection process for FROT and PROT. The 
PROT group consists of FROT firms partitioned into specific time periods before 
the rotation to capture the effect of audit policies on audit quality. From 2000 
to 2010, we identify 664 firms listed on the KRX market from the KIS-VALUE 
database after excluding financial institutions. We then exclude 154 firms with no 
financial data, 20 firms whose auditors were rotated in 2010 and firms listed on 
an overseas market  (Overseas firms did not adopt audit rotation policies), which 
leaves 490 firms. Firms rotated in 2010 are excluded for following reasons. First, 
K-IFRS early adopters in 2010 are not subject to mandatory rotation. Second, the 
number of firms subjected to mandatory rotation in 2010 was relatively small (20 
firms). Finally, auditors knew in advance the mandatory audit firm rotation policy 
would be replaced in 2010 which may affect manager’s opportunity and auditors’ 
incentives. There are 144 VROT firms which are not subject to the mandatory 
audit rotation policy because of early voluntary adoption of the audit firm rotation 
policy. 
Table 1
Sample selection
Mandatory rotation samples between 2006 to 2009 Number of firms
Non-financial companies 664
No financial data and non-financial available (154)
Mandatory rotation in 2010 (20)
Potential samples 490
Overseas listings (12)
Firms not subject to mandatory rotation (144)
Total samples (2006–2009) 334
Table 2 presents the distribution of our mandatory rotation sample. Panel A shows 
the number of mandatory rotation firms, classified by year and type. Among the 
total sample of 334 firms, the most frequent rotations occurred in 2009 (105 
rotations, 31.44%) and the least number of rotations occurred in 2007 (58 rotations, 
17.37%). With regard to audit firm switch type, Big4 to Big4 switch is the most 
frequent switch type (145 rotation types, 43.41%) and switching from Non-Big4 
Jong-seo Choi, Hyoung-joo Lim and Dafydd Mali
14
exceeds 20% of the total sample. Specifically, Non-Big4 to Non-Big4 and Non-
Big4 to Big4 switches occur on 71 occasions (21.26%) and 85 occasions (25.46%) 
respectively. A Big4 to Non-Big4 switch occurs less than 10%. Panel B exhibits 
the number of audit firm rotations since the 3-year auditor retention rule became 
effective in 1997. 36.23% of firms rotate their auditors twice and the cumulative 
ratio of firms that rotated their auditors more than three times exceeds 40%. We 
notice that frequent auditor switching is a common practice in South Korea. From 
2000–2010, only 20.06% of firms change their auditor once.
Panel C shows consecutive auditor retention periods prior to the regulation 
of mandatory audit firm rotation. We investigate from 1982, because 1982 is the 
year that the free audit engagement system became effective. Prior to 1982, under 
auditor designation rule, firms were not allowed to select audit firms. The results 
based on the investigation of auditor retention periods between 1982 and 2010 
show that 8 years of audit tenure exceeds 50% and 10 years of auditor retention 
occupies nearly 80% (78.44%). On the other hand, firms that retain their audit 
firms for more than 20 years occupy 6.59%. The longest retention period appears 
to be 25 years. Finally, Panel D reports industry classification. Our samples are 
classified by industry using two digit KSIC codes. The metal industry has the 
highest number of observations in our sample (12.87%), followed by the electrical 
machinery industry (10.78%), chemistry (9.58%) and the service industry (8.08%). 
The table shows that the sample firms are indiscriminately distributed throughout 
various industries.
Table 2
Distribution of samples
Panel A: Number of Mandatory Rotation Firms by Year and Type
Number of samples by year Number of samples by switch type
Year Number of Firm Ratio (%) Switch Type Number of Firm Ratio (%)
2006 71 21.26 Big4 to Big4 145 43.41
2007 58 17.37 Big4 to Non-Big4 33 9.88
2008 100 29.94 Non-Big4 to Big4 85 25.45
2009 105 31.44 Non-Big4 to Non-Big4 71 21.26
Total 334 100.00 Total 334 100.00
(continued on next page)
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Panel B: Number of Auditor Rotations since Auditor Retention Regime
Number of Switches Number of Firm Ratio (%) Cumulative Ratio (%)
1 67 20.06 20.06
2 121 36.23 56.29
3 96 28.74 85.03
4 44 13.17 98.20
5 6 1.80 100.00
Total 334 100.00
Panel C: Consecutive Audit Tenure before Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation
Tenure Number of Firm Ratio (%) Cumulative Ratio (%)
6 years 88 26.35 26.35
7 years 62 18.56 44.91
8 years 31 9.28 54.19
9 years 57 17.07 71.26
10 years 24 7.19 78.44
11 years 3 0.90 79.34
12 years 11 3.29 82.63
13 years 6 1.80 84.43
14 years 6 1.80 86.23
15 years 3 0.90 87.13
16 years 3 0.90 88.02
17 years 13 3.89 91.92
18 years 3 0.90 92.81
19 years 2 0.60 93.41
20 years 6 1.80 95.21
21 years 5 1.50 96.71
22 years 2 0.60 97.31
23 years 4 1.20 98.50
24 years 4 1.20 99.70
25 years 1 0.30 100.00
Total 334 100.00
Table 2: (continued)
(continued on next page)
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Panel D: Industry Classification
Industry Number of sample Percentage (%) Industry
Number of 
sample Percentage (%)
Fishing 5 1.50 Medicine and 
medical
25 7.49
Food and 
beverages
24 7.19 Electrical 
machinery
36 10.78
Non-metallic 
minerals
4 1.20 Construction 23 6.89
Textiles 18 5.39 Metal working 12 3.59
Pulp and paper 11 3.29 Distribution 20 5.99
Metal 43 12.87 Transport and 
storage
11 3.29
Service 27 8.08 Others 13 3.89
Computer 30 8.98
Chemistry 32 9.58 Total 334 100.00
RESEARCH DESIGN
Abnormal accrual model
Numerous studies use proxies for audit quality other than accruals based measures, 
which include auditor litigation (Heninger, 2001), propensity to issue a going 
concern opinion and benchmark beating (Carey & Simnett, 2006). However, 
these proxies based on publically available information have the potential to be 
influenced by organisational behaviour associated with legitimacy theory. Previous 
studies often use earnings response coefficients (Ghosh & Moon, 2005). The large 
majority of studies use signed and absolute abnormal accruals as proxies for audit 
quality (Heninger, 2001; Johnson et al., 2002; Richardson, Tuna, & Wu, 2002; 
Myers et al., 2003; Chi & Huang, 2005; Piot & Janin, 2007; Chen et al., 2008; 
Chi et al., 2009). Chi and Huang (2005) examine the effect of audit firm and audit 
partner tenures, using signed abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality. Other 
studies also use absolute abnormal accruals since earnings can be managed either 
upward or downward on terms favourable to management (Chen et al., 2008; Chi 
et al., 2009).
We use both signed and absolute values of abnormal accruals as proxies for 
audit quality. In deriving measures of abnormal accruals; we rely on the modified 
Jones model suggested by Dechow et al. (1995) and the performance-adjusted 
Table 2: (continued)
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Jones model suggested by Kothari et al. (2005), since Kothari et al. (2005) find 
that the inclusion of the firm’s prior year performance better explains earnings 
management. To estimate abnormal accruals, we estimate residuals from the cross-
sectional model, positive deviations from the residual are considered earnings 
management, hence lower accruals quality. Samples are cross-sectionally matched 
by year and industry. 
Dechow et al. (1995) model
/ / ( )/
/
TACC Assets Assets REV REC Assets
PPE Assets
1, , , , , ,
, , ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
1 1 1 2 1
3 1
T Ta a
a e
= + - +
+
- - -
-
 (1)
where,
TACCi,t : total accruals, 
Assets i,t-1: total assets of year t-1, 
∆REVi,t : change in revenue, 
∆RECi,t : change in accounts receivable, 
PPEi,t : gross amount of property, plant and equipment.
Kothari et al. (2005) model 
/ / ( )/
/
TACC Assets Assets REV REC Assets
AssetsPPE ROA
1, , , , , ,
, , , ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
1 1 1 2 1
3 1 4 1
T Ta a
a b e
= + - +
+ +
- - -
- -
 (2)
ROAi,t-1 : Return on Asset in period t-1
In Equation (3), we examine whether the mandatory audit firm rotation policy is 
associated with higher levels of abnormal accruals. Our dependent variables, AQ 
1–4 are signed and absolute values of abnormal accruals established in Equations 
(1) and (2). Our primary variable of interest is ROT, which is a dummy variable that 
indicates 1 if an observation belongs to the mandatory rotation sample (FROT), 
0 if either of the two benchmark groups (PROT or VROT). A negative relation 
between ROT and abnormal accruals would suggest that the mandatory audit firm 
rotation improved audit quality, supporting auditor entrenchment hypothesis. A 
positive relation would suggest that the mandatory audit firm rotation decreased 
audit quality, consistent with longer audit tenures improving audit quality, and the 
auditor expertise hypothesis. Statistically insignificant results would suggest no 
affect.
AQ ROT Size CFO MKBK Lev
Grw Deficit LAGTACC ID YD
, , ( , , , ) , , , , ,
, , , ,
i j t j i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
c c c c c c
c c c e
= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
=  (3)
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Dependent Variables:
AQ1(DAMJ): Abnormal accruals calculated using the modified Jones model, 
suggested by Dechow et al. (1995)
AQ2(DAKO): Abnormal accruals calculated using the performance adjusted model, 
suggested by Kothari et al. (2005)
AQ3(ABMJ): Absolute value of DAMJ (ABMJ)
AQ4(ABKO): Absolute value of DAKO (ABKO)
Variables of Interest:
ROT1 : Dummy variable that is 1 if mandatory rotation samples, 0 if benchmark 
1 sample (PROT)
ROT2 : Dummy variable that is 1 if mandatory rotation samples, 0 if benchmark 
2 sample (VROT)
Control Variables:
Size : Natural logarithm of total assets
CFO : Cashflow from operations
MKBK : Market value to book value ratio
Lev : Debt ratio
Grw : Sales growth
Deficit : Dummy variable that is 1 if a firm experienced a loss, 0 otherwise
LAGTACC: Total accruals in previous year
ID : Industry fixed effect
YD : Year fixed effect
To demonstrate the validity of our model, and to increase the robustness of our 
findings; first, we identify the key determinants for abnormal accruals from 
previous literature (our main audit quality proxy) that include firm size, firm 
performance, business risk, firm growth, market opportunity, previous accruals 
effect, and financial loss. Second, we consider several potential proxies for 
each determinant, for instance ROA, ROE, ROS, and CFO as a proxy for firm 
performance. Finally, we select the best proxy for each category using scatter plot 
and correlation coefficients that best explain our dependent variable. To control for 
the effect of outliers, all variables are winsorised at top and bottom 1% level before 
the model specification process. Table 3 illustrates operational definitions of all the 
variables considered for this study.
First, we control for Size, defined as the natural logarithm of market value. 
We expect abnormal accruals for larger firms to be lower following the political 
cost hypothesis. However, previous earnings management studies report mixed 
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signs with respect to size variables. Second, we include CFO, since a negative 
relation has been documented between accruals and cashflow from operations 
(Dechow, 1994; Sloan, 1996). Third, we include MKBK (market value to book 
value ratio) to control for variations in firms’ investment opportunity sets. Fourth, 
we include additional incentives to manage earnings such as Lev (debt ratio), and 
Grw (sales growth). Finally, we include a dummy variable for instances of loss 
reporting (Deficit) and (LAGTACC) controlling for the reversal effect of prior 
accruals (Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003). We do not include a variable to 
control for audit firm size since the switch type is tested separately. 
Table 3
Model specification and variable definitions
Variables Proxies Definitions Selected
Audit quality (DV) DAMJ Abnormal accruals computed from the 
modified Jones model, suggested by 
Dechow et al. (1995)
√
DAKO Abnormal accruals computed from the 
performance adjusted model, suggested 
by Kothari et al. (2005)
√
ABMJ Absolute value of DAMJ (ABMJ) √
ABKO Absolute value of DAKO (ABKO) √
Main Variables of Interest
Effect of MAFR 1 ROT1 (FROT vs 
PROT)
Dummy variable that is 1 if mandatory 
rotation samples, 0 if benchmark 1 sample 
(PROT)
√
Effect of MAFR 2 ROT2 (FROT vs 
VROT)
Dummy variable that is 1 if mandatory 
rotation samples, 0 if benchmark 2 sample 
(VROT)
√
Additional Test Variables
Effect of switch type Switch type Dummy variable that is one if Non-Big4 
to Big4 switch type, 0 otherwise
√
Effect of audit tenure Audit Audit tenure length √
Control Variables
Firm Size Size 1 Natural logarithm of total previous year 
total assets
√
Size 2 Natural logarithm of market capitalisation
Firm Performance ROE Return on Equity
ROS Return on Sales
ROA Return on Assets
(continued on next page)
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Variables Proxies Definitions Selected
CFO Cash flow from operation/TA at time t-1 √
Firm Risk Lev Total liabilities/Total owners’ equity √
Borrowings Total borrowings/TA at time t-1
CF to lev Cash flow to leverage ratio
CF to borrowings Cash flow to borrowings ratio
Firm Growth Asset growth (TA at time t/TA at time t-1)-1
OE growth (OE at time t/OE at time t-1)-1
Sales growth (Sales at time t/Sales at time t-1)-1 √
OI_growth (OI at time t/OI at time t-1)-1
Other Determinants of DA
Market opportunity MKBK Market to Book ratio √
Effect of previous 
accruals
TACC NI at time t-1 – CFO at time t-1 √
Loss firms Deficit Dummy variable that is one if a firm 
experienced loss, 0 otherwise
√
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for our dependent variables. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics and results of mean (median) difference tests of the mandatory 
rotation samples (FROT) versus two benchmark samples (PROT and VROT). 
First, we compare the mandatory rotation sample with itself in prior years. In the 
difference test, besides DAMJ, all accrual variables show significantly positive (+) 
signs for the FROT sample suggesting that abnormal accruals increased after the 
rotation period (compared to PROT). Likewise, abnormal accruals for FROT are 
generally larger than that the VROT sample. Thus, the univariate analysis suggest 
that the mandatory rotation sample has lower audit quality compared to the audit 
partner rotation policy sample firms, and firms that adopted the mandatory audit 
firm rotation voluntarily. 
Table 3: (continued)
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In Panel B, we further partition PROT into two sub periods; PROT 1 (year 
–6 to year –4), PROT 2 (year –3 to year –1) when the rotation year is set to 0, and 
compare these samples with FROT (year +1 to year +4). In PROT 1, managers 
have an opportunity to manage earnings because audit firms have an incentive to 
retain their clients. In PROT 2, audit firm firms will know in advance that their 
tenure will end on a given date. Therefore, the managers of the PROT 2 sample 
have a limited opportunity to manage earnings and audit firms have no incentive 
to retain audit contracts. The managers of the FROT sample also have limited 
opportunity to manage earnings and audit firms have no incentive to retain audit 
contracts. The mean level of abnormal accruals, computed from both the modified 
Jones model and the performance adjusted model show an increase in the FROT 
sample. For instance, the mean of DAMJ increases from 0.024 to 0.026 to 0.037 
over the three periods. The mean of DAKO is higher in the FROT sample (0.061) 
compared to prior periods (0.013) in PROT 1 and (0.014) in PROT 2. Thus, our 
results support the expertise hypothesis based on two factors. First, the levels of 
abnormal accruals increase in the FROT sample compared to PROT 2, a period 
when managers’ opportunity and auditor firms ‘incentives were similar. Secondly, 
the levels of abnormal accruals for the FROT sample is higher compared to PROT 
1, a period when managers had an opportunity to manage earnings and auditors 
had an incentive to retain an audit contract. The results obtained from absolute 
values of abnormal accruals are qualitatively similar to afore-mentioned results, 
albeit with slight differences. For example, the mean of ABMJ is the highest in the 
FROT sample (0.104); the ABMJ average during PROT 2 (0.084) is slightly lower 
compared to PROT 1 (0.086). The mean of ABKO in PROT 1 (0.067) is lower 
than other samples. However, FROT exhibits a slightly higher ABKO average 
compared to PROT 2. 
Panel C presents a difference analysis among different periods. The second 
and third columns compare FROT sample with PROT 2 and PROT 1 respectively. 
Although there are no statistically significant differences found in signed abnormal 
accruals between FROT and PROT 2, the absolute values of FROT appear to 
be larger. In comparison between FROT and PROT 1, DAKO and ABMJ show 
significant positive signs whereas DAMJ and ABKO do not. Thus, the data suggests 
that abnormal accruals, whether signed or absolute value based, tend to increase 
after the audit firm was rotated on a mandatory basis. The final column exhibits a 
difference test between period 2 (PROT 2) and, period 1 (PROT 1) and 3 (FROT). 
In period 2, auditors know in advance that they will be rotated mandatorily due to 
policy change, thus are less likely to have incentives to impair their independence. 
However, the results show that all abnormal accruals are not significantly different 
besides ABKO. Panel D outlines the results of Pearson correlation analysis among 
key variables. Our main variable, ROT, is generally significantly correlated with 
Jong-seo Choi, Hyoung-joo Lim and Dafydd Mali
24
all accrual variables suggesting positive linear correlations between poor audit 
quality and mandatory audit firm rotation. 
Multivariate Analysis: Abnormal Accruals
Our results from OLS regressions using abnormal accrual measures as dependent 
variables are presented in Table 5. Panel A reports our findings comparing the 
FROT and sample with itself in prior years (PROT). Panel B reports our findings 
comparing the FROT sample with the sample that voluntarily rotated their audit 
firm (VROT). Panel A shows the coefficients for ROT, a dummy variable that is 
one if an FROT firm, 0 otherwise (PROT) are significantly positive (0.031 and 
0.028) using absolute abnormal accruals (ABMJ and ABKO). The results suggest 
that the magnitude of abnormal accruals increases when auditors are mandatorily 
rotated. The coefficients are not significant for signed abnormal accruals (DAMJ 
and DAKO). We interpret that audit quality of firms that experience mandatory 
audit firm rotation is lower after the rotation compared to previous periods. Panel 
B shows that when the FROT sample is compared with the VROT sample, a 
sample consisting of firms not subject to the mandatory rotation policy, the ROT 
coefficients positive. The absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABMJ and ABKO) 
are significantly positive (0.019 and 0.026) suggesting that the level of abnormal 
accruals is higher for the sample that was mandated to rotate their auditors compared 
to the sample that adopted the policy voluntarily. The results are consistent with 
arguments made by opponents of the mandatory audit firm rotation, supporting 
the auditor expertise perspective. Our results are largely consistent with previous 
research suggesting that accounting failures and errors are likely to occur more 
frequently during the early stages following an audit firm change (Peirre & 
Anderson, 1984; Cercello & Nagy, 2004).
With respect to the control variables, we find that Size is generally 
positively associated with abnormal accruals, suggesting that larger firms use more 
abnormal accruals to manage earnings, inconsistent with political cost hypothesis. 
The CFO variable controlling for firm performance is positively associated with 
all dependent variables suggesting that firms with better performance use less 
abnormal accruals, consistent with findings in Dechow (1994) and Sloan (1996). 
MKBK, controlling for investment opportunity reveal inconsistent results. Lev, 
which controls for firm risk is generally positively associated with abnormal 
accruals, suggesting that firms with high debt ratios use abnormal accruals to 
increase reported earnings. Moreover, the Grw variable controlling for growth 
of firms is positively associated with abnormal accruals. In addition, the Deficit 
coefficient controlling for deficit firms and LAGTACC controlling for the reversal 
effect of prior accruals are generally significantly positive. Year fixed and industry 
effects are estimated. 
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Table 5
Abnormal accruals and mandatory audit firm rotation
Model : 
AQ ROT Size CFO MKBK Lev
Grw Deficit LAGTACC ID YD
, , ( , , , ) , , , , ,
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=
Panel A: FROT vs PROT Panel B: FROT vs VROT
DAMJ DAKO ABMJ ABKO DAMJ DAKO ABMJ ABKO
Intercept 0.162
(3.75)***
0.135
(2.11)**
0.352
(3.24)***
0.172
(2.69)***
0.221
(0.51)
0.348
(1.78)*
0.108
(3.52)***
0.327
(1.52)
ROT 0.006
(0.72)
0.009
(1.62)
0.031
(2.24)**
0.028
(2.73)***
0.042
(2.29)**
0.003
(1.64)
0.019
(2.76)***
0.026
(3.23)***
Size 0.026
(3.73)***
0.014
(4.73)***
0.008
(1.98)**
0.012
(2.31)**
0.006
(1.68)
0.002
(1.27)
0.003
(1.82)*
0.004
(2.42)**
CFO –0.623
(–5.67)***
–0.627
(–19.28)***
–0.381
(–16.58)***
–0.029
(–12.68)***
–0.531
(–4.73)***
–0.525
(–23.64)***
–0.154
(–9.64)***
–0.026
(–1.87)*
MKBK 0.014
(1.72)*
0.006
(1.81)*
0.016
(2.94)***
0.015
(3.96)***
0.004
(1.21)
0.004
(0.34)
0.004
(1.91)*
0.008
(3.21)***
Lev 0.082
(1.51)
0.004
(2.46)**
0.005
(5.27)***
0.004
(3.45)***
0.002
(1.57)
0.008
(4.35)***
0.007
(6.57)***
0.005
(4.76)***
Grw 0.026
(2.16)**
0.033
(3.18)***
0.027
(3.68)***
0.017
(2.96)***
0.019
(2.37)**
0.023
(3.72)***
0.022
(2.86)***
0.016
(2.57)**
Deficit 0.142
(16.64)***
0.122
(26.87)***
0.004
(0.72)
0.028
(6.14)***
0.123
(12.37)***
0.032
(18.72)***
0.014
(2.41)**
0.024
(4.87)***
LAGTACC 0.031
(0.73)
0.082
(5.14)***
0.067
(3.14)***
0.027
(3.26)***
0.031
(7.51)***
0.014
(4.53)***
0.006
(1.83)*
0.004
(1.95)*
ID YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Adj.R2 0.3084 0.3627 0.2459 0.2467 0.2898 0.3214 0.1874 0.1957
F value 38.76*** 29.49*** 28.76*** 23.54*** 92.54*** 181.52*** 39.54*** 42.51***
Obs. 2060 2060 2060 2060 1412 1412 1412 1412
The Effect of Auditor Switch Type and Audit Tenure
Our analysis suggests that the mandatory audit firm rotation policy is not effective 
in enhancing audit quality. The results show that the level of abnormal accruals 
increase after a firm adopts the mandatory audit firm rotation; firms that voluntarily 
adopted the policy have lower levels of abnormal accruals compared to firms that 
adopted the policy on a mandatory basis. Existing studies that examine the relation 
between audit switches and audit quality almost exclusively focus on audit firm 
tenure. Previous research suggests that the audit quality of Big4 firms is higher 
than Non-Big4 firms. To add robustness to our initial findings, we examine the 
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expertise hypothesis by testing if the audit quality of Big4 firms is higher than 
Non-Big4 firms. In order to test the effect of switch type, we identify four auditor 
switch types: Big4 to Big4, Big4 to Non-Big4, Non-Big4 to Big4, and Non-Big4 
to Non-Big4. We calculate the relation between audit switch types with a switch 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if switch type is from Non-Big4 to 
Big4 or 0 otherwise.
Moreover, to add further robustness to our initial findings, we consider the 
effect of audit firm tenure. Over the past decade, archival literature finds evidence 
that audit quality increases in extended audit tenure (Myers et al., 2003; Chi & 
Huang, 2005; Chi et al., 2009). We attempt to test the robustness of our findings by 
including audit tenure length. We include the audit variable representing the length 
of audit tenure prior to the mandatory audit firm rotation policy. The audit tenure 
length ranges from 6 years to 25 years for the FROT sample and the 6-years tenure 
represents the PROT period. Moreover, we include the audit*ROT as a control. 
Our model to test the effect of switch type and audit tenure is estimated by the 
following model:
/
*
*AQ ROT Audit Switch ROT Audit
ROT Switch Size CFO MKBK Lev Grw
Deficit LAGTACC ID YD
1 2, , ( , , , ) , , ,
, , , , ,
, , ,
i j t j i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12
c c c c c
c c c c c c
c c e
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + +
=
  (4)
Additional Variable:
Switch : Dummy variable that is one if Non-Big4 to Big4 switch type, 0 otherwise
Audit : Audit tenure length
Variables of Interest:
ROT1*Switch
ROT2*Switch
Table 6 illustrates our findings for the switch type effect and audit tenure. 
Panel A represents the results for the FROT sample versus the PROT sample. ROT, 
a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a firm mandatorily rotated their audit 
firm or 0 otherwise. (PROT) shows that the level of absolute value of abnormal 
ABMJ and ABKO is higher (0.027 and 0.021) compared to PROT sample firms, 
suggesting FROT sample firms have higher levels of abnormal accruals compared 
to the PROT sample. However, the interaction term ROT*switch, our main variable 
of interest shows a significantly negative coefficient suggesting that abnormal 
accruals are smaller when auditors are rotated from Non-Big4 to Big4. The partial 
effect of a Big4 accounting firm on audit quality is –0.021 for ABMJ and –0.016 
for ABKO. The Audit coefficient representing audit tenure, audit is statistically 
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negative for abnormal accruals (–0.003 ABMJ and –0.004 ABKO) suggesting 
that increased audit tenure has a positive effect on audit quality, consistent with 
previous findings (Chi & Huang, 2005; Carey & Simnett, 2006; Chi et al., 2009). 
However, the interaction term ROT*Audit shows a significant positive sign for 
ABMJ and ABKO despite insignificant signed abnormal accruals, suggesting that 
audit quality deteriorates when audit firms are mandatorily rotated after a period 
of 6 years, supporting the auditor expertise hypothesis. After controlling for audit 
tenure effect, the results for ROT*switch suggest that the mandatory audit firm 
rotation sample firms that switched from Non-Big4 to Big4 auditors have lower 
level of abnormal accruals. 
Table 6
Audit tenure and Switch type effect (Accrual-based Measure)
Model : 
*
*
AQ ROT Audit Switch ROT Audit
ROT Switch Size CFO MKBK Lev Grw
Deficit LAGTACC ID YD
1 1, , ( , , , ) , , ,
, , , , ,
, , ,
i j t j i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12
c c c c c
c c c c c c
c c e
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + +
=
Panel A: FROT vs PROT 
DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO
Intercept 0.172
(2.85)***
–0.034
(–0.12)
0.3647
(8.2)***
0.0862
(2.85)***
ROT1 0.008
(0.59)
0.009
(1.37)
0.027
(2.53)**
0.021
(2.68)***
Audit –0.001
(–1.60)
–0.005
(–1.84)*
–0.003
(2.06)**
–0.004
(–2.15)**
Switch –0.005
(–0.79)
–0.003
(–0.76)
–0.008
(–1.93)**
–0.006
(–1.98)**
ROT1*Audit 0.001
(0.08)
0.006
(0.99)
0.001
(2.16)**
0.008
(2.01)**
ROT1*Switch –0.012
(–1.07)
–0.007
(–0.99)
–0.021
(–1.87)*
–0.016
(–1.85)*
ROT2
ROT2*Audit
ROT2*Switch
Size 0.025
(3.44)***
0.014
(4.73)***
0.009
(2.13)**
0.007
(2.22)**
CFO –0.722
(–13.98)***
–0.724
(–17.78)***
–0.241
(–10.54)***
–0.027
(–11.66)***
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Model : 
*
*
AQ ROT Audit Switch ROT Audit
ROT Switch Size CFO MKBK Lev Grw
Deficit LAGTACC ID YD
1 1, , ( , , , ) , , ,
, , , , ,
, , ,
i j t j i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12
c c c c c
c c c c c c
c c e
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + +
=
Panel A: FROT vs PROT 
DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO
MKBK 0.015
(1.53)
0.005
(1.83)*
0.012
(2.86)***
0.016
(5.32)***
Lev 0.095
(2.34)**
0.002
(3.03)***
0.005
(5.16)***
0.003
(4.55)***
Grw 0.023
(2.27)**
0.023
(5.21)***
0.023
(3.46)***
0.016
(3.43)***
Deficit 0.121
(13.39)***
0.118
(29.57)***
0.004
(0.64)
0.031
(7.01)***
LAGTA 0.027
(0.63)
0.079
(6.11)***
0.059
(3.06)***
0.058
(4.15)***
ID YD Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 (%) 0.3120 0.3771 0.2251 0.2095
F value 34.75*** 27.26*** 23.65*** 20.49***
Obs. 2060 2060 2060 2060
Panel B represents the results for the FROT sample versus the VROT sample. 
Our primary variable of interest, Mand*Switch shows significantly negative signs 
for all the absolute value dependent variables (–0.029 and –0.012). This suggests 
that the positive sign of ROT was reversed to a negative coefficient due to the 
effect of Non-Big4 to Big4 switch type indicating the size of abnormal accruals 
generally decreased when auditors are mandatorily rotated from Non-Big4 to Big4 
compared to other switch types. Our variable of interest with regards to audit 
quality is increasing with audit tenure. Mand*Audit is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that the positive effect of longer audit tenure has dissipated due to the 
mandatory audit firm rotation. In summary, in our comparisons between PROT 
(VROT) and FROT, we find that audit quality generally increases when a company 
switches from a Non-Big4 to a Big4 accounting firm after controlling for the effect 
of audit tenure and other key determinants. 
Table 6: (continued)
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Model : 
*
*
AQ ROT Audit Switch ROT Audit
Mand Switch Size CFO MKBK Lev Grw
Deficit LAGTACC ID YD
2 2, , ( , , , ) , , ,
, , , , ,
, , ,
i j t j i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12
c c c c c
c c c c c c
c c e
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + +
=
Panel B: FROT vs PROT 
DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO
Intercept 0.205
(0.45)
0.673
(2.67)***
0.2145
(5.34)***
0.349
(1.45)
ROT1
Audit –0.012
(–2.51)**
–0.008
(–1.81)*
–0.011
(–2.52)**
–0.009
(–2.30)**
Switch –0.019
(–1.99)**
–0.012
(–2.38)**
–0.031
(–3.67)***
–0.014
(–2.76)***
ROT1*Audit
ROT1*Switch
ROT2 0.037
(5.29)***
0.002
(1.51)
0.021
(3.19)***
0.037
(6.20)***
ROT2*Audit 0.001
(0.66)
0.001
(1.24)
0.003
(1.11)
0.002
(1.20)
ROT2*Switch –0.027
(–1.47)
–0.021
(–1.65)
–0.029
(–2.27)**
–0.012
(–2.05)**
Size 0.004
(1.57)
0.001
(1.08)
0.004
(1.71)*
0.003
(2.31)**
CFO –0.564
(–23.66)***
–0.561
(–22.35)***
–0.172
(–8.16)***
–0.024
(–1.91)*
MKBK 0.004
(1.35)
0.005
(0.26)
0.005
(1.84)*
0.008
(4.99)***
Lev 0.003
(2.57)**
0.004
(6.41)***
0.005
(5.88)***
0.004
(7.75)***
Grw 0.017
(2.71)***
0.016
(4.67)***
0.016
(2.94)***
0.009
(2.88)***
Deficit 0.111
(17.54)***
0.091
(23.85)***
0.012
(2.31)
0.021
(6.38)***
LAGTA 0.029
(8.68)***
0.007
(3.80)***
0.005
(1.83)*
0.007
(2.41)**
ID YD Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 (%) 0.2724 0.3450 0.1662 0.1249
F value 90.90*** 196.46*** 18.26*** 34.66***
Obs. 1412 1412 1412 1412
Table 6: (continued)
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ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Sub-Periods Comparison
Our sample is partitioned into three periods, period 1 corresponding to year –6 to 
year –4, period 2 corresponding to year –3 to year –1, and period 3 corresponding 
to year +1 to year +4, when the rotation year is set to 0. Under the three-year 
auditor retention regime, firms are required to retain their external auditors for 
at least three-years. Therefore, in period 1 (PROT 1), auditors may impair their 
independence since they may wish to renew a contract for another 3 years. In 
period 2 (PROT 2), audit firms are less likely to impair their independence 
since they know in advance that their contract will end on a given date due to 
the mandatory rotation regime. For brevity, we combine PROT 1 and PROT 2 
as PROT in the main analysis because of similar results in table 3 (Panel B and 
C). For robustness, we perform additional analysis to test whether audit quality 
is affected by managers’ opportunity to manage earnings and an audit firms’ 
incentives to retain clients in different periods. We empirically test the PROT 1 and 
PROT 2 samples separately. Using Equation (1), we find that the coefficients for 
ROT are generally insignificant (besides DAKO), suggesting that audit quality of 
the FROT sample is indistinguishable from that of PROT 1 (untabulated). For the 
FROT versus PROT 2 regression, the absolute value of abnormal accruals appears 
to be positively correlated with ROT, suggesting that the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals is larger after firm rotation compared to PROT 2. Finally, for the three-way 
comparisons between PROT 2, FROT and PROT 1, the coefficients of ROT are 
generally insignificant; suggesting that audit the quality of PROT 2 is indifferent 
to other periods. These results are consistent with our previous finding, represented 
by PROT, (the PROT 1 and PROT 2 sample combined) that the mandatory audit 
rotation policy does not enhance audit quality using abnormal accruals. 
Alternative Measure of Audit Quality
We use an alternative measure of audit quality proposed by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002). Dechow and Dichev (2002) propose a measure of accruals quality 
determined by the extent to which working capital accruals map into operating 
cash flow realisations. To investigate whether our previous results in our main 
analysis (Kothari and modified Jones model) are robust to the alternative measure 
of audit quality suggested Dechow and Dichev, we run regression model (3) 
replacing the abnormal accrual variables with the newly computed signed and 
absolute value of abnormal accruals as the dependent variable. This alternative test 
yields practically identical results. Untabulated results provide insignificant and 
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significantly positive relations between accrual measures and the ROT variable for 
signed abnormal accruals and absolute value of abnormal accruals respectively. 
Positive and Negative Accruals 
The explanation for no significant association between ROT and signed abnormal 
accrual variables may be due to the fact that positive accruals and negative 
accruals are offset against each other. Myers et al. (2003) argue that regulators are 
not solely concerned with the dispersion in accruals, but they are also concerned 
about the distortion in earnings due to inappropriate income-increasing or income-
decreasing accruals. Earnings can either be managed upward (income-increasing) 
or downward (income-decreasing) on terms favorable to management. Myers et al. 
(2003) and Chi et al. (2009) also separate absolute abnormal accruals into positive 
and negative accruals. Following these studies, we identify positive and negative 
abnormal accruals to test whether new auditors restrict extreme income-increasing 
and/or decreasing activities. Previous studies posit that ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates can be considered biased in a truncated sample; therefore, we estimate a 
ML (maximum likelihood) truncated regression, consistent with previous studies 
(Greene, 2000; Myers et al., 2003; Chi et al., 2009). In untabulated results, we 
find mixed results. Specifically, for income-increasing accruals from DAMJ, the 
coefficient for ROT is significantly positive (0.006, z = 2.69) for FROT versus 
PROT comparison, suggesting that the FROT sample do not constrain extremely 
positive accruals compared to the PROT sample. Second, for income-decreasing 
accruals from DAMJ, the coefficient for ROT is insignificant (0.001, z = 0.20) for 
the FROT versus PROT comparison, suggesting that the audit quality of the FROT 
sample is indistinguishable from that of itself in prior years. All the coefficients 
for ROT for the FROT versus VROT comparison appear to be insignificant, again 
suggesting that there is no evidence supporting that the mandatory rotation regime 
enhances audit quality. The results from the DAKO partitions are consistent with 
above findings.
Alternative Tenure Proxies
We find a significant relationship between Audit (length of tenure) and the 
dependent variables, consistent with previous findings. As a further sensitivity 
analysis, the Audit variable was replaced by two additional dummy variables. The 
two dummy variables are audit tenure length of greater than 9 and 10 years in 
respective regressions. In these regressions, Audit is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the length of audit tenure is greater than 9 years (10 years), 0 
otherwise. Since our FROT sample has at least 6 years of prior audit tenure under 
the mandatory audit firm rotation policy, we intend to test whether longer audit 
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tenure prior to mandatory audit firm rotation affects audit quality following the 
auditor expertise hypothesis. Considering the cumulative percentage of six to eight 
years category of audit tenure before the rotation occupies 54.19% (See Panel C 
in Table 3), we compare our FROT sample with up to 8 years of previous audit 
tenure, with firms with more than 9 years (10 years) of previous audit tenure. 
Untabulated results are generally consistent with earlier results based on the 
accrual models. We find that the coefficients for Audit*ROT using absolute value 
of abnormal accruals are significantly positive at 5% (10%) for ABMJ (ABKO) 
in the FROT versus PROT regression. Despite the coefficients for Audit*ROT 
using signed abnormal accruals being positive, they appear to be insignificant. 
For the FROT versus VROT comparison, all the coefficients for Audit*ROT are 
positive but only significant using DAKO and ABKO as the dependent variables. 
In summary, abnormal accruals after the rotation are generally larger when length 
of previous audit tenure is longer. These findings suggest that the length of audit 
tenure has positive effect on audit quality, consistent with prior findings (Myers et 
al., 2003).
Real Earnings Management Metrics
Real earnings management (REM) is considered a deviation from ‘normal’ 
business practices to achieve a particular earning level (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Management may use a combination of real earnings management and abnormal 
accruals as tools to manage their reported earnings. Alternatively, a firm may 
choose between the two earnings management mechanisms using the technique 
that is less costly to them (Mali & Lim, 2016). Zang (2012) reports the decision to 
engage in real earnings management or abnormal accruals earnings management 
is dependent on a firm’s relative cost. By employing REM measures as dependent 
variables, we test whether firms subject to mandatory audit firm rotation are more 
likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management using REM after rotation. 
If the audit entrenchment hypothesis is true, client firms may have an incentive 
to engage in REM since audit firms’ incentives to accommodate clients to retain 
contracts would cease.
We rely on prior studies to develop our proxies for real earnings manipulation. 
We combine the three individual measures established by Roychowdhury (2006). 
A positive deviation from the sample’s normal level of real activities is considered 
real earnings management (the residual from one of the three estimation models). 
A negative deviation is interpreted as earnings management for our production 
cost measure (Prod). A positive deviation is interpreted as upward earnings 
management based on CFO and discretionary expenses (SGA). We combine 
the three individual measures to calculate two comprehensive metrics of REM 
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activities, as suggested by Cohen and Zarowin (2010). We multiply abSGA and 
abCFO by minus 1 to interpret positive values as positive earnings management 
and include both measures as the dependent variable in Equation (3). 
TRM1 = abProd + abSGA*(-1) (5)
TRM2 = abCFO*(-1) + abSGA*(-1) (6)
where,
abCFO : Abnormal CFO is calculated using the Roychowdhury model (2006)
abProd : Abnormal production cost is calculated using the Roychowdhury model 
(2006)
abSGA  : Abnormal discretionary expenses is calculated using the Roychowdhury 
model (2006).
Untabulated results show mixed signs for REM proxies in both comparisons, 
FROT versus PROT and FROT versus VROT. However, we do not observe a 
significant relationship between REM and audit policy. Thus, we conclude that the 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy has no effect on real earnings management. 
Test for Predictive Validity
The main objective of our study is to examine the marginal effect of the mandatory 
audit firm rotation policy on audit quality. Therefore, for robustness, we establish 
our model’s key determinants based on previous abnormal accrual and audit quality 
literature. To test the accuracy of our results, and to confirm the reliability of our 
findings, we use the cross validation technique to test the predictive validity of our 
model. First, we partition our entire sample into two data sets; training (60%) and 
holdout (40%) samples. Next, using the training sample, we conduct a stepwise 
regression and only include variables where the student t-value is greater than 
2.00 (Woodside, 2013). As a result, we drop some redundant t predictors, overall 
the adj-R2 increases. We repeat this process for every analysis determinant in this 
study to find the optimal model. Third, we test the newly specified model from the 
training sample, against the holdout sample. Finally, we test the predictive validity 
of the model using leave-one-out cross validation (a method to assess how the 
results of an empirical analysis will generalise to an independent data set).
We show the results of our earnings management models in Table 7. In 
short, the results are qualitatively unchanged. The root mean square residual (RMR) 
of the holdout sample, where zero RMR indicates a perfect fit ranges from 0.06 
to 0.11 (slightly higher than the training sample). The mean absolute percentage 
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error (MAPE), where zero MAPE is a perfect fit, ranges from 0.06 to 0.14 (a little 
different to the training sample), suggesting that the models have a reasonably 
high predictive and explanatory power. Our results consistently suggest that audit 
quality of the mandatory rotation firm sample is lower or indifferent compared to 
the two benchmark samples. Moreover, non-big4 to big4 switches and audit tenure 
generally have a positive effect on audit quality. 
Table 7
Test for predictive validity
Panel A: Earnings Management Model 1
Training Sample (60%) Holdout Sample (40%)
FROT vs PROT DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO
ROT 0.01
(1.28)
0.01
(1.31)
0.01
(2.49)**
0.01
(2.19)**
0.01
(1.77)*
0.01
(1.54)
0.01
(1.93)**
0.01
(1.90)*
Obs. 1243 1243 1243 1243 817 817 817 817
Predictive Validity
RMSE 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07
MAE 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05
FROT vs VROT
ROT 0.02
(1.60)
0.01
(1.17)
0.03
(2.07)**
0.03
(3.91)***
0.02
(1.34)
0.03
(0.42)
0.03
(1.81)*
0.05
(3.93)***
Obs. 728 728 728 728 684 684 684 684
Predictive Validity
RMSE 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08
MAE 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
Panel B:Earnings Management Model 2
FROT vs PROT DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO
ROT1 0.01
(0.47)
0.02
(1.74)*
0.02
(1.73)*
0.02
(1.96)*
0.00
(0.13)
0.02
(1.73)*
0.04
(2.30)**
0.02
(1.65)
Audit –0.00
(–0.92)
–0.00
(–1.08)
–0.00
(–2.67)**
–0.00
(2.41)**
–0.00
(–1.42)
–0.01
(–1.79)*
–0.00
(–2.47)**
–0.00
(–2.21)**
Switch –0.01
(–1.27)
–0.00
(–1.06)
–0.00
(–2.10)**
–0.01
(–1.83)*
–0.01
(–0.72)
–0.02
(–1.59)
–0.01
(–2.34)**
–0.01
(–1.59)
ROT1*Audit 0.00
(0.21)
0.00
(1.01)
0.00
(2.24)**
0.00
(1.60)
0.00
(0.51)
0.01
(0.55)
0.02
(1.78)*
0.01
(1.71)*
ROT1*Switch –0.02
(–1.23)
–0.01
(–0.90)
–0.02
(–2.02)**
–0.01
(–1.75)*
–0.01
(–0.70)
–0.01
(–0.88)
–0.01
(–1.71)*
–0.01
(–1.75)*
Predictive Validity
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FROT vs PROT DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO DAMJ DAKO AB_MJ AB_KO
RMSE 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07
MAE 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05
FROT vs VROT
ROT2 0.05
(2.52)***
0.01
(1.47)
0.01
(2.36)**
0.05
(3.05)***
0.03
(1.72)*
0.03
(0.77)
0.01
(2.35)**
0.03
(1.94)*
Audit –0.04
(–0.84)
–0.02
(–0.69)
–0.01
(–1.75)*
–0.01
(–0.36)
–0.00
(–0.52)
–0.02
(–0.29)
–0.01
(–1.93)*
–0.01
(–1.38)
Switch –0.03
(–0.97)
–0.02
(–0.16)
–0.08
(–3.71)***
–0.02
(–1.36)
–0.02
(–0.68)
–0.02
(–0.47)
–0.03
(–1.02)
–0.01
(–0.25)
ROT2*Audit 0.03
(0.65)
0.03
(0.84)
0.01
(1.42)
0.02
(0.82)
0.01
(0.45)
0.03
(0.34)
0.01
(1.57)
0.01
(1.16)
ROT2*Switch –0.04
(–1.41)
–0.02
(–0.83)
–0.09
(–3.66)***
–0.01
(–1.73)*
–0.01
(–1.14)
–0.01
(–0.43)
–0.05
(–2.36)**
–0.03
(–2.12)**
Predictive Validity
RMSE 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08
MAE 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigate the effect of the mandatory audit firm rotation policy 
on audit quality using a Korean sample from 2000 to 2009. In Korea, a six-year 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy was introduced in 2006 on a firm-by-firm 
basis and was repealed in 2010. Our study is motivated by the uniqueness of 
the short-lived Korean experiment as well as the current debate surrounding the 
effectiveness of mandatory audit firm rotation, recently rekindled in the U.S. and 
Europe. The arguments in favor of the policy are based on the belief that longer 
audit tenure impairs audit quality. The Korean experience is a rare experiment, 
which lasted only for five years. We attempt to take advantage of Korea’s case to 
examine the relationship between the mandatory audit rotation policy and audit 
quality.
Using accrual-based measures, we conduct a series of empirical tests to 
determine the association between the implementation of the mandatory audit 
firm rotation policy and changes in the level of audit quality. We find evidence 
suggesting that the audit quality of the mandatory rotation firms in post turnover 
period is generally lower relative to prior periods (mandatory audit partner rotation) 
or audit quality is indifferent. The results are consistent when audit quality of the 
mandatory sample is compared with that of firms not subject to the mandatory 
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audit rotation policy in the same sample period. A ‘fresh view’ and increased 
auditor independence under the mandatory audit firm rotation policy was expected 
to increase audit quality in South Korea. However, using abnormal accruals, audit 
quality is found to be higher under the mandatory audit partner policy. Our results 
suggest that the loss of firm specific knowledge after the adoption of the mandatory 
audit firm rotation period has led to a decrease in accounting quality compared 
to partner rotation periods, periods partners are able to cooperate. Previous 
studies have focused on the effect of audit quality after the implementation of the 
mandatory audit partner rotation or mandatory audit firm rotation using a before 
and after approach. However, our paper is the first to compare the mandatory audit 
partner and mandatory audit firm rotation policies. Our results suggest that the 
mandatory audit firm rotation does not perform its intended purpose to enhance 
audit quality. Moreover, in some instances, audit quality decreases compared to 
periods of mandatory audit partner rotation. We also find that the mandatory audit 
firms rotation sample whose auditors were rotated from Non-Big4 to Big4 are 
generally associated with lower levels of abnormal accruals due to the audit quality 
superiority of Big4 audit firms compared to Non-Big4. Finally, we find evidence 
that longer audit tenure has a positive effect upon audit quality. 
Regulatory authorities should proceed with caution when considering 
the advantages of mandatory audit firm rotation as a policy with the potential to 
improve audit quality and auditor independence. We provide evidence supporting 
the auditor expertise in the Korean setting. The data suggests that mandatory audit 
firm rotation, a policy based on the auditor entrenchment hypothesis is not effective 
in enhancing audit quality. Given the substantial additional costs associated with 
changing an audit firm and the negative effect on audit quality after the adoption of 
the policy, we believe the policy is not justified.
Our study, to our knowledge, is one of the first to directly compare the 
effectiveness of mandatory audit firm rotation policy and the mandatory audit 
partner rotation policy. We note that accounting standards and other regulatory 
systems before the adoption of IFRS in Korea are similar to the U.S. Therefore, we 
believe that our findings could provide useful implications for policy makers in the 
U.S. and European countries wherein the mandatory audit firm rotation policy is 
emerging to be a controversial issue.
However, our study may have some limitations. We focus on the impact of 
the mandatory audit firm rotation policy on audit quality using abnormal accruals 
as proxies for audit quality. Whilst an extensive literature finds abnormal accruals 
to be a plausible proxy for audit quality, the proxy is not free from ‘noise’ (Chi et 
al., 2009). Also, we do not directly control for the mandatory audit partner period 
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using a dummy variable approach specifically due to the data unavailability. 
However, our approach, dividing our mandatory audit firm rotation samples into 
two different periods in which firms have different incentives to satisfy client’s 
requirements to retain an audit contracts offer an unique insight, and adds additional 
robustness. Moreover, since our investigation is based on a unique institutional 
setting, our findings may not be readily generalisable to other nations with different 
legal and regulatory environments. In addition, the research period was short and 
overlapped the final crisis. However, despite these limitations, overall our results 
provide consistent evidence supporting the auditor expertise hypothesis, that the 
mandatory audit rotation policy did not improve audit quality in a Korean context. 
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